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Philosophy is the oldest of the disci-
plines that have been taught in places that
we have called universities for centuries.
Many of the readers of this journal have a
PhD—nominally we are doctors of philos-
ophy—even if you hadn’t especially cared
or even noticed. This is, of course, a hold-
over of a history and tradition that dates
back to the ancient Greeks and is based on
the primacy of philosophy over all other
academic pursuits.
But most scientists never even took a
class in the history much less the philos-
ophy of science. I would submit that only a
small subset of practicing scientists might
have actually stopped doing science and
asked themselves questions such as: How
does science work? How does it progress?
Is there even progress in science? How is
knowledge gained and accumulated? Sci-
entists do strongly believe that there is
progress, but you might be surprised that
philosophers and other scholars in the
humanities don’t necessarily think so.
Scientists nowadays do not tend ask
themselves philosophical questions about
the nature of science; they are too busy,
they are preoccupied with figuring out
how to get their papers published in
journals such as PLoS Biology or how they
will get their next grant application
funded. Rarely, if ever, do they take the
time to read what historians of science and
much less philosophers of science think
that they, the supposed study objects,
actually do in their daily lives. If pressed,
some researchers would, following Karl
Popper’s dictum, claim to be doing ex-
periments in an effort to falsify a hypoth-
esis, and to be working using the ‘‘hy-
pothetico-deductive method.’’ But in un-
guarded moments they would say that
they are collecting evidence ‘‘for’’ rather
than ‘‘against’’ their favored hypothesis.
Self-reflecting scientists are surely going
to encounter at least a small handful of
philosophers of science during their pon-
derings. Karl Popper’s The Logic of Scientific
Discovery [1] and his falsification of hypoth-
eses is probably on the top of the list. Next
might be Thomas Kuhn, who in The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions [2] developed
the still prominent idea that a paradigm-
driven phase of ‘‘normal science’’ may
encounter anomalies that then can cause a
crisis and eventually a scientific revolution
and paradigm shift would be expected to
follow. A very different view on how
science advances was espoused by Paul
Feyerabend (1924–1994) whose latest—
posthumously published—book The Tyran-
ny of Science [3] is the focus of this review.
He is considered by many to be the third
greatest 20th century philosopher of sci-
ence. In his international bestseller from
1975 Against Method [4], Feyerabend said,
‘‘The only principle that does not inhibit
progress is: anything goes’’ (p. 23) and
‘‘Unanimity of opinion may be fitting for a
church, for the frightened or greedy
victims of some (ancient, or modern) myth,
or for the weak and willing followers of
some tyrant. Variety of opinion is neces-
sary for objective knowledge. And a
method that encourages variety is also
the only method that is comparable with a
humanitarian outlook’’ (p. 46). Feyera-
bend argues strongly against the power
that he sees science has: ‘‘The separation
of state and church must be complement-
ed by the separation of state and science,
that most recent, most aggressive,
and most dogmatic religious institution’’
(p. 295).
Before I go on I have to come clean on
a couple of things. I have to admit that I
hold a few prejudices against philosophers
and even have a rather polemical rela-
tionship towards philosophy. This might
prevent you from reading on. And this
attitude will surely disqualify me with
people in the humanities, but those people
don’t read science journals anyhow, ap-
parently even some of those that philo-
sophically interpret science for a living. In
my opinion this makes it hard to take them
seriously. And I am not alone. Even highly
regarded philosophers, such as the late
Richard Rorty from Stanford, espoused
the—particularly in his circles—provoca-
tive view that philosophy as the seeker of
absolute truths long ago lost its authority.
That’s maybe why he chose to teach in the
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It seems fair to say that most scientists
don’t care about philosophy or religion—
they don’t need miracles and gods to make
sense of the world. We are content with
materialistic explanations, thank you very
much. The scientific laws and rules that
scientists discover suffice for them and
guides (or restricts?) their view of the
world. And this materialism hurts the
philosophers’ pride. In turn, the philoso-
phers’ irrelevance for at least the daily life
of most scientists, and the influence that
scientists rather than philosophers now
have on modern life, makes a surprising
number of philosophers apparently distain
science and scientists’ power. The philos-
ophers’ traditional hold on explaining the
world is threatened or even superseded by
scientific insights and technological and
biomedical progress. Moreover, most sci-
entists’ ignorance of history and philoso-
phy is unfathomable to philosophers,
adding insult to injury. But what do they
expect? Where does rationality reside if
not in the sciences?
Well, is that really true? I am sure that
the majority of scientists don’t even ask
themselves these kinds of questions, since
(at least I presume) most of us firmly
believe that science is a deeply rational
endeavor and exercise. At the beginning of
the 20
th century the nascent discipline of
philosophy of science still also strongly
held this opinion. But—and this might
surprise scientists—in the 1960s this tradi-
tional view on the science’s rationality
began to be challenged. Today, a rational
view on science, so I am told, is seen as
old-fashioned and seems to be even a
minority opinion in philosophy of science
departments. This change in fashion was
due mostly to the American Kuhn and,
most importantly, to his then still friend
the Austrian-born Feyerabend. Since his
Against Method [4], science is seen by many
philosophers not as a rational exercise, but
as one that takes place in a historical,
social, and political context. Those factors
are seen to exert far more influence on
what science is done and how its results
are interpreted and implemented than
methodological principles or rational sci-
entific thought. The philosophical Dadaist
Feyerabend is often credited with this
change of attitudes of philosophers of
science.
Feyerabend actually published more
books posthumously than while he was
alive. The year after his death his
autobiography Killing Time [5]—its title in
German is Zeitverschwendung (which means
waste of time)—appeared. It made clear
that he was a cynic and a provocative
clown, who also suffered from severe
depressions. At times he actually seemed
to get scared of the influence he had
gained himself and reversed his message
repeatedly throughout his career. He
seemed to feel that he had wasted his time
and those of others that actually took him
seriously—an honest Dadaist. Fifteen
years after his death, the first volume of
his Naturphilosophie [6] was published. He
began work on the planned three volumes
of Naturphilosophie already in the early
1970s. It was thought that he had not
finished it until a manuscript was discov-
ered in the archives of my university’s
library that holds Feyerabend’s papers.
Without getting bogged down in details in
Naturphilosophie he attempts to cover every-
thing from cave drawings to nuclear
physics and quantum theory and how it
changed how the world is viewed, a
subject that was so important to him that
he had planned to devote the last two
volumes of Naturphilosophie to it.
Paul Feyerabend surely was an interest-
ing character. I actually experienced him
first hand in his lectures in Berkeley in the
1980s when I was studying there for my
Ph.D. in Zoology. In those years, Feyer-
abend held professorships both at the
ETH in Zurich and in Berkeley attesting
to his cloud. Early in his life he had studied
theatre, something that obviously stayed
with him. He was the consummate dandy
and showman. Feyerabend had a limp
from a war injury, but because of it (I had
just learned about Amotz Zahavi’s hand-
icap principle), or in spite of it, he had a
throng of attractive female students that
followed him around and even carried his
brief case to the lecture hall. This kind of
stardom of the intellectual kind is some-
thing that is not as prevalent in the
sciences as it apparently is in the human-
ities. The lecture hall was always packed
with eager students who even sat on the
floor in front of the podium. He was very
entertaining and fun to listen to, but in the
end his main message only seemed to be
that there is no one method of how science
works and how it advances, if it advances
at all. The one who screams the loudest
will get heard seemed to be his credo and
he surely made a ruckus and—maybe
occasionally to his own chagrin—he did
get heard. This method for academic
success is in my estimation something that
will work better in the humanities, where
one does not deal with measurements,
data, or testable theories and falsifiable
hypothesis, but rather with words alone.
The Tyranny of Science [3] is the English
translation from the original, published in
1996 in Italian. The book is based on tape
recordings of four lectures with the
misleading titles: ‘‘Conflict and Harmo-
ny,’’ ‘‘The Disunity of Science,’’ ‘‘The
Abundance of Nature,’’ and ‘‘Dehuman-
izing Humans.’’ I at least could not quite
tell why the chapters have the titles that
they do, because, for example, the first
chapter mostly deals with different aspects
of Greek philosophy, Homer, and the
meanings of Greek tragedies. If you are
curious about what Socrates said and how
Parmenides got it all wrong these lectures
provide an entry point that is educational.
All chapters are easy to read. They hold
your interest because of a barrage of
seemingly unconnected tidbits of informa-
tion and, for me at least, because of a
bewilderment that someone can see the
world so differently from what I was
brought up to believe.
Feyerabend challenges some of what he
considers to be modern myths about
science, including the myth that ‘‘science
is successful.’’ From reading his book one
gets the feeling that he really does not like
science or at least deeply distrusts the whole
scientific enterprise and what he calls
scientific ideology. He does not see a need
to spend times in laboratories and to know
what scientist actually do in their daily lives.
Feyerabend clearly states that he does not
want tolearnhow science isdone—that’sin
his opinion not important, to him it’s just
background noise to the major events in
science. Stances such as those made
Feyerabend a guru of, so-called, postmod-
ern pluralism. To a scientist this sounds
crazy; we like to think that facts should
inform one’s idea of science—but this is
surely too simple a thought for those in the
parallel universe that is philosophy.
So what, you ask, if anything, is the
relevance of Feyerabend to biologists? To
be perfectly blunt I do not see much of
any. Many would say that biology has
taken over the role of the lead science
since the revolution of molecular biology
from physics. But this is something Feyer-
abend pretty much ignores. He only
quotes from Jacques Monod’s Chance and
Necessity [7], and he mentions the Berkeley
biochemist Daniel Koshland (1920–2007)
in a negative sense about the costs of the
human genome project. That’s about it.
Fittingly, Ernst Mayr in The Growth of
Biological Thought [8] mentions Feyerabend
only in passing in one sentence together
with Kuhn in regards to the issue of
progress in science.
Still, The Tyranny of Science really makes
for an entertaining and thought-provoking
read—even if it did not change my outlook
on science and I would imagine that it will
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admittedly interesting thoughts and obser-
vations will probably only make you
realize how separate the two cultures of
the sciences and humanities have become,
even in a subject matter such as philoso-
phy of science where at least one group of
scholars purportedly cares about what the
other does. Philosophical Dadaism a la
Feyerabend will not help you get your next
paper published. When your next grant is
rejected and you read the panel’s report, it
might console you to have learned that the
world is not a rational place, and even
science might not always be. It is probably
true that the rationality of science is only
an imaginary idealistic supposition. But, if
you are honest with yourself, you will say
that you already knew that.
Editors’ note: Does the cultural
divide between science and the humani-
ties, first articulated by C. P. Snow over 50
years ago, still exist between biology and
philosophy? In a mini experiment to find
out, we asked a philosopher and biologist
to review the recent English translation of
Tyranny of Science, by 20th century philos-
opher Paul Feyerabend, perhaps best
known for rejecting the claim that science
is a singular discipline unified by common
methods and concepts.
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